Ever since turning communist, China has set top-down targets for its economy.
Mao Zedong wanted to double steel output in a year, and crippled the country trying.
During his rule, China often fell woefully short of its goals.
After his death, it often comfortably surpassed them.
Lately policymakers have tried to ensure it does neither;
their growth targets serve both as a floor and a ceiling to their ambition.
They should aim higher.
The latest target was unveiled on March 5th, during the National People's Congress (npc), China's rubber-stamp parliament.
The government set a growth objective of 4.5-5% in 2026, lower and looser than last year.
This has elicited a variety of responses.
Some economists think the target is still too high.
China's workforce is shrinking, its property market is moribund,
consumers are cautious and exports may not come to the rescue as they did last year.
Although the dangers of the trade war have receded, actual war threatens some of its markets in the Middle East.
Others argue that the target is just right.
The NPC delegates will almost all vote in favour.
Even among professional forecasters, the consensus guess is that China will grow by 4.6% this year,
if only because policymakers will steer it there or thereabouts.
A third camp thinks the whole exercise is fanciful.
China's growth figures, they argue, bear little relation to reality.