Some call it 9/24 for short.
On September 24th last year China's officials decided to engineer a rally in the stockmarket.
The central bank cut interest rates and bank reserve requirements.
It also enabled companies to buy back their shares and institutional investors to leverage their balance-sheets more easily.
The markets took the hint.
Buy "everything", advised an American hedge-fund manager.
A year later, the Shanghai composite,
an index of pretty much everything that can be bought on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, is up by about 40%.
The rally drew strength in its early stages from the promise of fiscal stimulus and enthusiasm for homegrown artificial intelligence.
More recently it has gained momentum from the government's efforts to discourage price wars,
which, though good for consumers, are bad for the profits on which shareholders have the final claim.
Last month the index exceeded 3,800 for the first time in ten years.
But the government's ultimate goal was not merely to revive the market.
It hoped the market would help revive the economy, too.
Unfortunately, the economy has refused to take the hint.
High stock prices can provide a lift to shareholders' paper wealth and morale,
which might encourage them to spend—what economists call the "wealth effect".
Rich valuations can also give firms the means and the motivation to expand their businesses.
On top of this, a buoyant, bustling stockmarket improves the fortunes of the brokers,
dealers and banks that handle share purchases and finance them.